THE SUPREME COURT OF
IRELAND
No. 162/99
Denham, J.
Lynch, J.
Barron, J.
IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILD ABDUCTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
CUSTODY ORDERS ACT, 1991
AND IN THE MATTER OF K.T.M. AND H.L.M., INFANTS
BETWEEN
T.M.M.
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT
AND
M.D.
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT
Judgment of Mrs. Justice Denham delivered the 8th day of
December, 1999
This is an appeal by the plaintiff/appellant (hereinafter
referred to as the plaintiff) against a decision of the High Court (McGuinness,
J.) made on the 20th January, 1999 refusing to return the children to the place
of their habitual residence. The plaintiff�s application was made pursuant to
the Child Abduction and Enforcement of Custody Orders Act, 1991, and the Hague
Convention, in regard to the abduction of the two children from the jurisdiction
of England and Wales.
The plaintiff is the mother of the two children and the
defendant/respondent (hereinafter referred to as the defendant) is their
maternal grandmother. K.T.M. was born on 28th October, 1987 and H.L.M. was born
on 21st December, 1992. The children were brought to Ireland on 23rd October,
1997 by the defendant and their grandfather and have resided continuously in
this jurisdiction since then in the Cork area. Proceedings under the Hague
Convention were issued by the plaintiff on 11th March, 1998. The defendant swore
an affidavit on 25th March, 1998 and a supplementary affidavit on 26th March,
1998. There was a gap in the proceedings. It was submitted that as a result of
an assault on her by her partner the plaintiff sustained an injury in the month
of May, 1998 and she was unable to deal with the proceedings for some
considerable time. It appears that there was time at the end of March and during
the whole of April within which the plaintiff could have responded prior to the
assault alleged in May. However, the plaintiff swore an affidavit on the 27th
October, 1998. A further affidavit was sworn by the defendant on the 9th
November, 1998 and an affidavit of laws was sworn on the 4th November, 1998.
Finally, there was a further affidavit sworn by the solicitor for the plaintiff,
which exhibited an English social welfare report, on the 17th November, 1998.
The affidavits and exhibits were opened before the learned trial
judge. It was acknowledged before her that both social welfare reports were
hearsay and would be inadmissible according to the ordinary rules of evidence.
However, it was agreed by counsel that the learned trial judge would read both
social welfare reports. McGuinness, J. read the reports, relying on the consent
of counsel and on article 13 of the Hague Convention.
The learned trial judge spoke to the elder child. Of this
McGuinness J. stated:
"In addition, again pursuant to Article 13 of the Convention, I
spoke to the older child, K. whom I considered to have sufficient maturity so
that it was appropriate to take her views into account. I did not interview the
child, H., because it appeared to me that she was too young to be interviewed by
the court."
The facts of the case were found by the learned trial judge to
include:
�The Plaintiff and her husband, G.M. were married on 21st June,
1995, in a registry office in England, and they were divorced on 28th May, 1997.
They had had a long prior relationship, and it appears that they may have been
married in the Roman Catholic Church in or about 1986. They lived in England
throughout their relationship and marriage. The children were born in England
and until they were removed to Ireland have always been resident in England.
Until in or about 1995 Mr. & Mrs. D., that is the Defendant and her husband,
also lived in England and the Plaintiffs siblings, her sister J. and brother P.,
and her sister K. all lived in England for a large part of the children�s lives.
The Plaintiff lived across the road from the mother and father, Mr. & Mrs.
D., in London. It is fully accepted that prior to the removal to this
jurisdiction the habitual residence of the children was in England.�
The learned trial judge found that the defendant and the
children's grandfather, Mr. & Mrs. D., are Irish and that they had wished to
return to reside in Ireland, which they did in 1995. As to the plaintiff, the
learned trial judge stated:
�From the Social Welfare Report of Janet Martin of Lambeth
Social Services, the Plaintiff has a ten year history of alcohol abuse and
periodic bouts of depression, and she also records that the children�s father
had a history of alcohol abuse and depression and was, at the time of the
report, living in an alcohol recovery unit. On account of the alcohol abuse the
Plaintiff and both children spent long periods of time in the de facto custody
and care of their grandparents, their married aunt K.D.A. and her husband. Their
uncle P., their unmarried aunt J.D., also cared for them and played a large part
in their upbringing. Apparently when Mr. & Mrs. M. went on holidays to Egypt
with the children, Miss D. accompanied them so as to help care for the children
and make sure of their safety.�
The learned trial judge found that the background history given
by the defendant was borne out by the report of Janet Martin, the social welfare
worker in England, who had stated that the infants remained with the extended
family for three or four months at a time. The learned trial judge also noted
the acknowledged violent abuse by Mr. M., the father of the children, of the
plaintiff. It was noted also that Mrs. M. herself sets out that there was
violence in her new relationship, which was one of the reasons for the delay in
the proceedings.
As to the present position of the plaintiff�s alcoholism, the
learned trial judge said:
� ... it is acknowledged clearly by the social worker, Janet
Martin, that Mrs. M. has made considerable efforts to overcome her alcoholic
problem, but I am somewhat doubtful as to how successful these efforts have
been. This is to some extent also borne out by what the child K. herself says.�
The learned trial judge found that the children's aunt, K.D.A.,
removed the children from the care of the plaintiff on the 4th October, 1997 and
kept them for a period of two weeks. It appeared that she did this because the
plaintiff had returned to drinking. Then on the 23rd October, 1997 the defendant
removed the children to Ireland. A letter was sent to the plaintiff informing
her that the children were being moved to Cork and that they would be living
there with her mother (their grandmother, the defendant) and attending a named
school in Cork. On the 28th October, 1997, the plaintiff gave authority to the
Central Authority in England and Wales to seek the return of the children under
the Hague Convention.
Before the High Court there were a number of defences argued,
including (a) that there was no wrongful removal of the children; (b) that there
was acquiescence by the plaintiff; and (c) that there was a defence under
Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention. On (c), the third issue raised, the
learned trial judge stated:
�In this case, however, it is accepted that the mother was
unable to care for her children over long periods of time during their whole
lifetime, because of her alcoholism. It seems to me the Social Welfare Report of
Janet Martin is very guarded in regard to the prognosis of the Plaintiff. It is
not at all clear how far she has recovered from her alcoholism, and in some ways
the small incident which occurred in this Court might suggest a remaining lack
of control.
The father of the children is no longer on the scene and clearly
he is not a satisfactory alternative carer. It is accepted that he behaved
violently towards his wife and that he too has severe drinking problems. The
mother's new boyfriend, if he is still part of the relationship, seems to be an
additional risk of violence. It seems to me that on the facts as shown in the
Affidavits, which are not fully denied, that there is a very real risk of
physical and psychological harm which, in my view, cannot be met by
undertakings, although of course I accept that the English courts would enforce
undertakings, and there are no problems as might arise in other jurisdictions.
The children have been in Ireland for fifteen months, which I
cannot ignore, and they are at school and doing very well. K. herself stressed
to me that this was the longest time she had ever spent in any school and that
she was extremely happy in the school that she is in. It is by no means certain
that the English Courts would give custody to the mother, in fact Mrs. D.A. has
proceedings in being in the English Courts seeking custody of the children, and
these proceedings have been adjourned generally with liberty to re-enter, but
they can be re-entered or restored, as it says in English law.
If the children again come before the Courts in England there is
still a possibility that they would be returned to Ireland in the custody of
their grandmother. This would cause even more disturbance than they have already
suffered, and they have suffered quite enough disturbance in their young lives.
If proceedings in regard to their custody take place in this jurisdiction, there
is no threat to the mother in Irish law. Her position in Irish law if anything
is even stronger than in English law because she has the constitutional right of
custody, which must be to the forefront of any wardship proceedings. So that
there is no question of her being discriminated against in proceedings in this
jurisdiction.
Finally, I would turn to the views of K., herself. Mr. O'Riordan
[Counsel] drew my attention to page 611 of Mr. Shatter's 4th Edition of his book
on Family Law where he deals with this question, and refers to cases which have
come before the Courts and there are a number where children have been
interviewed. He states on p. 611,
�The child's return may also be refused if the child objects to
being returned and �is of an age and of a degree of maturity at which it is
appropriate to take account of his views�. In D.C. v. V.L.C., Morris, J.
held that a child's objection to return to its country of origin can only be
relied upon where the objection is advanced for �mature and cogent reasons�.�
The learned trial judge held:
�I think that it would be wrong for the Court to rely only on
K.'s opinion. She is quite a young child, though she did seem to me in
conversation with her to be a highly intelligent child and quite a mature young
lady for eleven years of age. Indeed, sadly some of her maturity can be due to
the fact that she has led a somewhat difficult life in the past.
I have interviewed children on a number of occasions in regard
to family matters, although it is not a practice that I would go in for very
often. I am well aware of the danger that children may be coached in what they
are to say to the Court. This child was, I am certain, not coached. I am sure
she was expressing her sincere opinion. I do not wish to go into all the details
of what she said. I don't think it would be fair, but there are one or two
things I feel I must convey in this judgment. Firstly, K. not merely objects to
returning to England and to the custody of her mother, she exhibits a very real
fear of so doing. I am convinced that this fear is sincerely held and not
induced by any third party. She gave details of the [cogent] reasons for her
fear. K. is very happy in Cork with her grandparents, and in particular she is
happy at her school. As I say, she stresses it is the school in which she has
been longest in in her whole life. She tells me that she is even getting on
quite well in catching up on the Irish language, which of course she [did not]
learn in England. She appreciates and understands her present stability and she
fears to lose it.
Finally, some concerns were expressed by the Social Welfare
worker in Cork, Miss. O�Neill, and were mentioned in Court in regard to the
children having nightmares and sleep-walking. I had some concerns about this and
I asked K. about the frequency and nature of her nightmares. She told me that
they were decreasing but that she was still walking or talking in her sleep. I
asked her about the nature of the nightmares and sadly she told me that they
were nightmares of her mother coming to get her, and drunkeness and the other
aspects of her earlier life. She found it hard to control her tears at the
prospect of returning to her former situation in England.�
The learned trial judge came to the conclusion:
�Given the entire background to this case, together with the
feelings expressed by K., I cannot but conclude that there is a grave risk that
a return to the English jurisdiction, which must, in the circumstances, mean a
return to the custody of the Plaintiff, poses a grave risk of physical and
psychological harm to these children, and would place them in an intolerable
situation. I also take into account both the child�s objections and under
Article 13, the Social Welfare Report of Janet Martin. It is a sad situation and
the mother's difficulties are very unfortunate but, as is always the case in
this type of proceedings, it is the child�s welfare which must be foremost in
the Court's mind.
I will therefore refuse the Orders sought in the Special
Summons. I understand from Miss O'Regan, Counsel for the defendant, that
wardship proceedings are being prepared. I am conscious that the present
proceedings are summary proceedings and do not deal fully with all of the issues
of custody, access and so on because it is important that these aspects should
be dealt with in a full way with evidence from all sides. So I would urge Mr.
and Mrs. D. to press ahead with wardship proceedings so that all of the evidence
in regard to the welfare of these children can be brought before the Court and a
secure decision made as to their future.�
On this appeal it was not contested that the infants were
wrongfully removed by the defendant from England on 23rd October, 1997. Nor was
the matter of any acquiescence by the plaintiff a significant feature of the
submissions in this court. The appeal was argued by counsel for the plaintiff,
Ms. Anne Dunne, S.C., on the following grounds:
1. It was contended on behalf of the plaintiff that the learned
trial judge erred in law and in fact in refusing to return the children and each
of them to their country of habitual residence and that the refusal was
unreasonable where the learned trial judge deemed that such return meant a
return to the custody of the plaintiff when, in fact, proceedings in England and
Wales in relation to the custody of the children by their aunt were extant and
upon the reliance by the learned trial judge upon future putative wardship
proceedings to be brought by the defendant.
2. It was submitted on behalf of the plaintiff that the learned
trial judge erred in fact in relying upon the plaintiff�s distress in court as a
matter to be taken into account when refusing the return of the children; in
finding that there was very real risk of physical and psychological harm to the
children; in holding without evidence or sufficient evidence before her that the
plaintiff was still abusing alcohol and in holding that there was a very real
risk of physical and psychological harm which could not be met by undertakings
and in holding that undertakings were inapplicable to the facts of the
situation.
3. It was submitted on behalf of the plaintiff that the
interviewing of one of the said infants by the learned trial judge and her
reliance on same to ground the refusal to return the children was inappropriate
and was an error in law and in fact. It was further submitted that the use of
unsworn evidence obtained in the absence of the legal representatives of the
parties, in particular the plaintiff, where the subsistence of same was not
revealed in front of the parties and in circumstances where there was no
corroboratory evidence and which had such a prejudicial effect upon the
plaintiff, was erroneous in law and in fact.
4. It was submitted on behalf of the plaintiff that the use by
the trial judge of the test of welfare of the child in relation to the child
abduction proceedings was incorrect in law.
Reference was made to case law by counsel for the plaintiff:
A.S. v. P.S. (Child Abduction), [1998] 2 I.R. 244; K. v. K.
Unreported, Supreme Court, 6th May, 1998; N. v N. (Abduction: Article 13
defence), [1995] I F.L.R. 107; Re: C. (Abduction; grave risk of physical
or psychological harm) [1999] 2 F.L.R. 478; Re: B. (Abduction : Article
13 defence), [1997] 2 F.L.R. 573; and Re: K. (Abduction: psychological
harm) [1995] 2 F.L.R. 550.
Decision
On the first ground argued by counsel for the plaintiff, that it
was not any risk to return the children to the jurisdiction of England and Wales
but that a risk might be in the return of the children to the plaintiff, I am
satisfied that the plaintiff�s submission fails. There was evidence before the
High Court upon which the learned trial judge could determine that the return of
the children to England would in fact be a return of the children to the
plaintiff. Whereas their aunt has commenced proceedings before the courts in
England and Wales seeking their custody, the plaintiff remains their parent with
custody in England and Wales and any such return at this time would be to the
plaintiff. This, of course, is not to suggest in any way that the courts of
England and Wales would be incapable of protecting the children, it is merely
that on the facts of the case, if they were returned, they would be returning to
the custody of the plaintiff.
In relation to the second series of grounds submitted by counsel
for the plaintiff, I am satisfied that it was appropriate for the learned trial
judge to rely upon events which take place in the courtroom before the trial
judge when considering whether or not to return children to a parent who is
before the court. Thus, the learned trial judge was entitled to rely upon the
plaintiff's conduct in court as one of the matters to be taken into account.
Further, I am satisfied that in the circumstances of the case and article 13 it
was entirely appropriate to rely upon the social welfare reports exhibited with
the affidavits which, with the consent of counsel (quite properly) were read and
considered and accepted by the learned trial judge. Taking the evidence in the
affidavits and the social welfare reports into consideration, there was evidence
upon which the learned trial judge could find facts and hold that the plaintiff
was still abusing alcohol and that in all the circumstances there were
reasonable grounds to hold that the situation could not be met by undertakings
and that undertakings were inapplicable.
The grave risk defence arises under article 13 which states:
�Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding article, the
judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is not bound to
order the return of the child if the person, institution or other body which
opposes its return establishes that -
...
(b) there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose
the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an
intolerable situation.�
The learned trial judge made a determination on the facts. There
was evidence before her which entitled her to come to the conclusion as to grave
risk which she did. Thus, the discretion for the court envisaged under article
13 arose. The learned trial judge had evidence upon which she could find the
facts she did and whereupon she could exercise the discretion in favour of
refusing the application to return the children.
In relation to the plaintiff's claim that it was inappropriate
on behalf of the learned trial judge to consider the social welfare reports and
to rely upon them as evidence, it is relevant to note the final paragraph of
article 13 which states:
�In considering the circumstances referred to in this Article,
the judicial and administrative authorities shall take into account the
information relating to the social background of the child provided by the
Central Authority or other competent authority of the child's habitual
residence.�
In relation to this article, the Explanatory Report on the
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction by Elisa
Perez-Vera states at paragraph 117:
�... The third paragraph contains a very different provision
which is in fact procedural in nature and seeks on the one hand to compensate
for the burden of proof placed on the person who opposes the return of the
child, and on the other hand to increase the usefulness of information supplied
by the authorities of the State of the child's habitual residence. Such
information, emanating from either the Central Authority or any other competent
authority, may be particularly valuable in allowing the requested authorities to
determine the existence of those circumstances which underlie the exceptions
contained in the first two paragraphs of this article.�
Applying this article it was appropriate for the court to
consider the social welfare reports exhibited together with the affidavits. This
was especially so in this case as counsel consented to such a process. This is a
summary procedure and it is entirely in accordance with such a process that such
an approach be taken. Consequently, I uphold the approach of the learned trial
judge on this matter.
On this appeal counsel for the plaintiff laid stress on the
third ground. It was submitted that the interviewing by the learned trial judge
of the elder child and the reliance on same to ground the refusal to return the
children was an error in law and in fact.
Counsel for the defendant, Mr. Cormac Corrigan, S.C., pointed
out that there were no regulations providing how the courts should implement the
Child Abduction and Enforcement of Custody Orders Act, 1991. He referred to the
United Nations Convention on Children, article 12, which states:
�1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of
forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all
matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in
accordance with the age and maturity of the child.
2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided
the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings
affecting the child, either directly, or through a representative of an
appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national
law.�
Counsel for the defendant submitted that the learned trial judge
was a very experienced judge in family law and that she had approached the
interviewing of this child and the weighing of the evidence of the child in an
entirely appropriate manner. He submitted that the judge cannot be faulted for
her method of interviewing the child.
The penultimate paragraph of article 13 of the Hague Convention
states:
�The judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to
order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being
returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is
appropriate to take account of its views.�
The Explanatory Report on the Convention on the Civil Aspect of
International Child Abduction by Elisa Perez-Vera in discussing articles 13 and
20, i.e the possible exceptions to the return of the child, states at paragraph
113:
�... In general, it is appropriate to emphasize that the
exceptions in these two articles do not apply automatically, in that they do not
invariably result in the child�s retention; nevertheless, the very nature of
these exceptions give judges a discretion - and does not impose upon them a duty
- to refuse to return a child in certain circumstances.�
In addition, it is stated at paragraph 30:
�In addition, the Convention also provides that the child�s
views concerning the essential question of its return or retention may be
conclusive, provided it has, according to the competent authorities, attained an
age and degree of maturity sufficient for its views to be taken into account. In
this way, the Convention gives children the possibility of interpreting their
own interests. Of course, this provision could prove dangerous if it were
applied by means of the direct questioning of young people who may admittedly
have a clear grasp of the situation but who may also suffer serious
psychological harm if they think they are being forced to choose between two
parents. However, such a provision is absolutely necessary given the fact that
the convention applies, ratione personae , to all children under the age
of sixteen; the fact must be acknowledged that it would be very difficult to
accept that a child of, for example, fifteen years of age, should be returned
against its will. Moreover, as regards this particular point, all efforts to
agree on a minimum age at which the views of the child could be taken into
account failed, since all the ages suggested seemed artificial, even arbitrary.
It seemed best to leave the application of this clause to the discretion of the
competent authorities.�
This aspect of article 13 is a separate ground. The child's
views alone are sufficient basis to refuse to return her. I agree with the
approach in S. v. S.(Child Abduction) (Child's Views) [1992] 2 F.L.R. 492
where it was determined that the part of article 13 which relates to the child�s
objection to being returned is completely separate from paragraph (b) which
referred to the grave risk of physical or psychological harm and that there is
no reason to interpret that part of the article as importing a requirement to
satisfy paragraph (b) or to interpret the word �object� to mean something
stronger that its literal meaning. However, this is an area where the exercise
of the discretion of the judge must be done with great care. I agree with the
approach of Balcombe LJ, in S. v. S.(Child Abduction) (Child's Views)
where he stated at pages 500-501:
�(2) The establishment of the facts necessary to �open the
door� under Article 13
(a) The questions whether:
(i) a child objects to being returned; and
(ii) has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is
appropriate to take account of its views;
are questions of fact which are peculiarly within the province
of the trial judge. Miss Scotland submitted that the child�s views should not be
sought, either by the court welfare officer or the judge, until the evidence of
the parents has been completed. We know of no justification for this submission.
She also asked us to lay down guidelines for the procedure to be adopted in
ascertaining the child�s views and degree of maturity. We do not think it is
desirable that we should do so. These cases under the Hague Convention come
before the very experienced judges of the Family Division, and they can be
relied on, in those cases where it may be necessary to ascertain these facts, to
devise an appropriate procedure, always bearing in mind that the Convention is
primarily designed to secure a speedy return of the child to the country from
which it has been abducted.
(b) It will usually be necessary for the judge to find out why
the child objects to being returned. If the only reason is because it wants to
remain with the abducting parent, who is also asserting that he or she is
unwilling to return, then this will be a highly relevant factor when the judge
comes to consider the exercise of discretion.
(c) Article 13 does not seek to lay down any age below which a
child is to be considered as not having attained sufficient maturity for its
views to be taken into account. Nor should we. In this connection it is material
to note that Art 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child ... provides
as follows ....
(d) In our judgment, no criticism can be made of the decision by
Ewbank J, to ascertain C's views, nor of the procedure which he adopted for that
purpose. There was evidence which entitled him to find that C objected to being
returned to France and that she had attained an age and degree of maturity at
which it was appropriate to take account of her views. Those are findings with
which this court should not interfere.�
The learned trial judge had a discretion. It was entirely
appropriate for the learned trial judge to have interviewed the elder child. The
method by which she interviewed the child, whilst not exclusionary of other
appropriate methods, was not inappropriate. Nor was it an error of law. Nor was
the learned trial judge in error in relying, as she did, upon the interview with
the child. The convention is quite clear on its face that a child who objects to
being returned and who has attained an age and degree of maturity is entitled to
have his or her view taken into account. The learned trial judge addressed
specifically the age and maturity of the child and her views. Consequently, the
learned trial judge was entitled to rely upon the child�s view as she did. It
was entirely appropriate that the trial judge did so in such a way as to make it
quite clear that the child�s view accorded with other determinations which she
had made in this case so as to protect the child�s long-term psychology. Whilst
it is a separate ground, a decision not to return a child to the country of its
habitual residence is a decision of the court and care should be taken, as here,
that it is not, nor does it appear to be, the decision of the child.
The fourth and final ground of the appeal by the plaintiff
related to the test of the welfare of the child in relation to abduction
proceedings as being incorrect in law. Counsel for the defendant, Mr. Cormac
Corrigan, S.C., submitted that the learned trial judge did not deal with the
welfare of the children in the context of a custody dispute. He submitted that
there is authority that the interests of the children are paramount. He referred
to the preamble of the convention and In the matter of R. (A minor): P. v.
B. (No. 2) [1999] I.L.R.M. 401. He also referred to Re: M [1997] 2
F.L.R. 690. He submitted that all these cases state that the interest of the
child is paramount. He argued that it is appropriate and permissible to take
into account such evidence as establishing the interest of the child within the
context of article 13 of the Convention. He accepted that the broad sweep of
evidence relevant to the welfare of the child, for example under the
Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964, would be impermissible. But, he submitted,
the learned trial judge considered the welfare of the child in the context of
article 13(b), and that that is permissible.
It was quite clear that the convention does not require the
court to consider the welfare of the child in the same way as is required under
the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964, and other child related legislation in
Ireland. Indeed such plenary hearings are contrary to the summary procedure
envisaged under the convention. Nor is the issue of any balancing between the
care under the abductor or under the person from whom the child was abducted a
factor in the Convention. The Convention envisages summary proceedings to return
infants to the place of their habitual residence unless the exceptional
circumstances under the Convention arise. However, it was equally clear that the
Convention does enable the court to look at the interests of the child. In the
explanatory report by Elisa Perez-Vera on the Convention it is stated at
paragraph 116:
�The exceptions contained in [Article 13] b deal with situations
where international child abduction has indeed occurred, but where the return of
the child would be contrary to its interests, as that phrase is understood in
this sub-paragraph. Each of the terms used in this provision is the result of
fragile compromise reached during the deliberations of the Special Commission
and has been kept unaltered. Thus, it cannot be inferred, a
contrario, from the rejection during the Fourteenth Session of proposals
favouring the inclusion of an express provision stating that this exception
could not be invoked if the return of the child might harm its economic or
educational prospects, that the exceptions are to receive a wide
interpretation.�
Consequently, the learned trial judge was entitled to consider
the interests of the child as she did. The interests of the child as envisaged
under the Convention are not identical to the concept of the welfare of children
under national legislation.
Delay
It is with concern that once again I note that in a child
abduction case there has been considerable delay in processing the application.
Proceedings under the Hague Convention are intended to be summary and completed
in a speedy fashion. This is the type of case which should be on a fast-track
management process.
Conclusion
For the reasons set out in this judgment I would dismiss the
plaintiff's appeal on all grounds.