http://www.incadat.com/ ref.: HC/E/UKs 76 [20/07/1993; Inner House of the Court of Session (Extra Division) (Scotland); Appellate Court] Zenel v. Haddow 1993 SC 612, 1993 SLT 975, 1993 SCLR 872
INNER HOUSE OF THE COURT OF SESSION: First Division
20 July 1993
Lords Allanbridge, Mayfield and Morton of Shuna
Z. v H.
Counsel: For Petitioner and Reclaimer, Davie; For Respondent, Fitzpatrick (Inner House), Dewar (Outer House)
LORD ALLANBRIDGE. On 25 March 1993 the Lord Ordinary dismissed a petition
which had been presented to this court by the reclaimer. The petition was
presented under Pt. I of the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985 for return of
the child who had been removed from Australia at about the end of November 1992.
The petitioner and the respondent had formed a relationship in about December
1987 and there is one female child of the relationship born on 27 June 1991.
As is outlined by the Lord Ordinary, most of the facts are not in
dispute and are helpfully summarised by him in his opinion of 25 March 1993. The
respondent is a Scot and went to Australia on a 12 month working holiday towards
the end of 1987. She met the petitioner in December 1987 and formed a
relationship with him. The petitioner is an Australian national and the parties
lived together for nearly two years until separating in November 1990. A formal
separation agreement was then entered into in terms of which the respondent made
over to the petitioner her share of the house formerly occupied by them and he
paid her a certain sum in exchange. Subsequently, when she was about six months
pregnant, the respondent returned to Scotland in March 1991.
There were
then further communications between the parties in the course of which the
respondent wrote a letter, dated 14 April 1991, in which she stated that she had
been really missing the petitioner, could not wait to see him, and was "looking
forward to getting back to Australia as a family." The petitioner came to
Scotland for the birth of the child which occurred on 27 June 1991. Following
the birth the petitioner was registered as the father of the child and an
Australian passport was obtained for the child.
The petitioner then
returned to Australia, via America, and some days later he was joined by the
respondent and the child who arrived there about 1 September 1991. Thereafter
the parties lived together for a period of about 15 months until about 27
November 1992. The respondent, having told the petitioner that she was going to
spend the weekend with relatives, boarded an aeroplane and, together with the
child, returned to Scotland. About a week previously, the respondent had
consulted a solicitor in Melbourne and had been advised, without any reference
being made by the solicitor to the Convention on the Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction (see Sched. 1 to the 1985 Act), that
she had the option of returning to Scotland and immediately applying for a sole
custody order through the Scottish courts (see Melbourne solicitor's letter,
dated 5 February 1993).
During the parties' 15 month period of
cohabitation between September 1991 and November 1992, the Lord Ordinary said he
considered that the relationship between them was an uneven one and, in any
event, there was clear affidavit evidence to the effect that latterly the
respondent had become most unhappy. In her affidavits the respondent maintained
that the relationship between the parties was never satisfactory. Nevertheless,
the Lord Ordinary accepts that fairly soon after they returned to Australia, the
parties purchased a new kitchen and that, at a much later stage, they actively
considered selling the house in which they then resided and moving to more
spacious accommodation. In addition, in March 1992, the respondent herself
obtained temporary employment and, in June 1992, she took up full time
employment as a personnel assistant. In her affidavit (no. 16/4 of process) the
respondent stated she had begun to think seriously about returning to Scotland
in about July 1992 and finally decided definitely to do so a day or two prior to
her departure at the end of November 1992.
At this stage of his opinion
the Lord Ordinary then explains there was one important area of dispute between
the parties which related to an understanding said by the respondent to have
been reached between the parties prior to her return to Australia in September
1991. The petitioner denied that there was any such understanding, and the
dispute as to whether it was established in evidence and, if so, what effect, if
any, it had on the proper interpretation of the parties' rights under art. 13 of
the Convention, lies at the heart of this reclaiming motion. In his opinion, the
Lord Ordinary explains that after considering the available evidence he found as
a fact (p. 978F, supra) that: "when the respondent returned to Australia in
September 1991 she did so as part of an attempted reconciliation with the
petitioner and on the express understanding that, if the relationship again
failed, she and the child would return and live with her mother in Scotland."
This understanding, if established in evidence, requires to be
considered against the background of the statutory provisions contained in arts.
3, 12 and 13 of the Convention. Three matters were originally the subject of
dispute between the parties at the hearing before the Lord Ordinary. In the
first place it had been averred in the respondent's answers that there was a
grave risk that the return of the child to Australia would expose her to
physical or psychological harm in terms of art. 13 (b), but during the course of
the hearing it was accepted by the respondent that this ground of opposition
could no longer be maintained after the petitioner had given an understanding
that the respondent and the child would be allowed the free and exclusive
occupancy of the house in which the parties formerly resided pending the outcome
of custody proceedings in Victoria. In the second place the respondent raised as
a preliminary issue the question whether the child was "habitually resident" in
Australia prior to her removal from that country within the meaning of art. 3.
That matter was decided in favour of the petitioner by the Lord Ordinary who
held that the respondent, and therefore the child, was so resident in Australia,
and the respondent has not reclaimed against that part of his decision.
In the third place the Lord Ordinary said there was a dispute between
the parties as to whether the petitioner had consented to the removal of the
child in terms of art. 13 (a). The Lord Ordinary decided this dispute in favour
of the respondent and sustained the respondent's fourth plea in law to the
effect that the petitioner having consented to the removal of the child from
Australia, the prayer of the petition should be refused. The debate before us
was solely concerned with the question of whether the Lord Ordinary had been
entitled to sustain the respondent's said fourth plea in law.
The
submissions put forward by counsel on behalf of the petitioner fell broadly into
two main categories. In the first place she argued that the Lord Ordinary had
erred in law in his interpretation of the proper meaning of art. 13 (a) as
regards the petitioner's alleged consent to the removal of the child from
Australia. In the second place she argued that in finding that there had been a
prior agreement between the parties on this matter, the Lord Ordinary had erred
in holding any agreement in September 1991 established by the evidence and
furthermore, even if it was established, he had erred in finding that it was
still extant at the time of the actual removal of the child in about November
1992. I think it is convenient to consider first whether the Lord Ordinary erred
in arriving at his factual conclusions before deciding whether he erred in law
in his interpretation of the provisions of art. 13 (a).
At the beginning
of her submissions counsel for the petitioner said she founded very strongly on
the fact that when the petition and answers came before the Lord Ordinary on the
first day of the hearing on 18 March 1993 no question had been raised in the
pleadings as to whether or not the petitioner had consented to the removal of
the child. In fact the respondent had admitted in her original answers that she
had removed the child without the petitioner's consent. The question of consent
was raised by the Lord Ordinary himself on the first day of the hearing. After
some discussion between him and counsel for the parties, counsel then acting on
behalf of the respondent asked for an adjournment to consider his position as
regards amending his pleadings regarding the matter of consent. It was not
disputed by counsel who appeared for the respondent before us that the Lord
Ordinary had initiated this matter and, having had the opportunity of looking at
the minutes of proceedings, I note that on the following day the appropriate
minute of amendment for the respondent was allowed subject to the condition that
the petitioner, if so advised, could lodge further affidavits by 10 a.m. on
Tuesday, 23 March 1993, which was the third day of the four day hearing. On that
day counsel for the petitioner lodged a further affidavit from the petitioner,
dated 22 March 1993, in which he emphatically denied any suggestion of an
agreement between the respondent and himself that she could take the child back
to Scotland. Counsel then acting for the respondent lodged four new affidavits.
Three of these affidavits were further affidavits from the respondent's mother
and two of her friends in Australia, A.M. and A.P., which were dated 22 or 23
March 1993 respectively, and an affidavit from a friend of the respondent's
family in Scotland, R.S., dated 22 March 1993. In his opinion the Lord Ordinary
indicates that he took into account in reaching his decision on the facts the
most recent affidavit of the petitioner, but left out of account these four
affidavits lodged on behalf of the respondent on the third day of the hearing
because he agreed with counsel for the petitioner that in the circumstances
there could be some doubt as to their spontaneity and reliability (p. 978G-H,
supra).
Counsel for the petitioner made no attack on, or complaint
about, the procedure adopted by the Lord Ordinary in this case and I am
satisfied that it was reasonable in the circumstances of such a hearing which
proceeded on affidavit evidence alone. However, I have noted her point that the
question of consent was initiated by the Lord Ordinary in this case. I have also
noted that at the time he did so he had two affidavits of the respondent before
him which made reference to a discussion and an agreement between the parties
before the respondent's return to Australia (see no. 15/1 of process, dated 11
February 1993, and no. 12/2 of process, dated 17 February 1993).
Counsel
for the petitioner made a detailed and careful analysis of the affidavit
evidence in this case in her submissions to us. She stressed that because this
court could look at the affidavits and the other documentary evidence in the
same way as the Lord Ordinary had done then this court could equally well asses
the credibility of the parties and their witnesses. I do not accept that such an
approach is open to this court. It is for the judge at the hearing on the
affidavit evidence to assess the weight and effect of that evidence and this
court can only disturb his findings in fact if it is satisfied that the Lord
Ordinary was so plainly wrong that his conclusion on the facts was one at which
no reasonable Lord Ordinary could have arrived. Counsel for the petitioner did
not dispute that she required to meet such a test but submitted that she could
do so in the circumstances of this case.
I do not find it necessary to
detail all the submissions that counsel made in her attack on the credibility of
the pursuer's witnesses. I can however quote some examples which she quite
properly put before the Lord Ordinary and again put before this court. She
pointed out that the Lord Ordinary stated (at p. 978D, supra) that the
respondent got clear support for her account of the events in the affidavits of
F.M. and A.M. but that the respondent had, in one of her letters, described A.
as a person who tends to talk "garbage and tell me to say and do things that I
wouldn't think about." Furthermore, counsel for the petitioner said that F.M.
could hardly be said to support the respondent on the question of the existence
of an agreement because all she said was that when the respondent went to
Australia to attempt a reconciliation "there was no doubt in my mind that Rhona
intended to come home to Scotland with Brianne if the reconciliation did not
work." Counsel also attacked the credibility of A.P. because in her first
affidavit she said she first met the respondent in June 1992 whereas in her
second affidavit she referred to what the respondent had told her in October
1991 when they were visiting a food shop together. Counsel then said that the
fact that these witnesses were unreliable, as demonstrated by the affidavits,
reflected on the credibility of the respondent herself as they were her friends.
I have considered all the criticisms of counsel for the petitioner
regarding the witnesses and her other comments on the evidence, but I consider
these were all matters for the Lord Ordinary to take into account and I am not
persuaded that he failed to do so. A close reading of his opinion demonstrates
he carefully considered all these matters of credibility, and counsel for the
petitioner very properly accepted that, in view of the terms of s. 1 of the
Civil Evidence (Scotland) Act 1988, the Lord Ordinary did not require to find
corroboration of the respondent's evidence before he could accept her evidence
alone as proof of the alleged agreement.
There were two further main
submissions by counsel for the petitioner on the evidence. She submitted that it
was inconsistent for the Lord Ordinary to find the respondent was "habitually
resident" in Australia and at the same time to find that by November 1992 there
had not been a reconciliation. The Lord Ordinary had reviewed the facts having
regard to the relevant case law as to what is required to establish habitual
residence (pp. 978J-979G, supra) and reached the conclusion that in November
1992 the respondent was habitually resident in Australia as at that date. He
explains that in the present case the parties had lived together in Australia
continuously for 15 months, had installed a new kitchen and had considered
moving house elsewhere in the state of Victoria. In addition, the respondent had
herself obtained full time employment some five months prior to her departure
from the country. As explained by Lord President Hope at p. 703B of
Dickson v. Dickson: "It is enough to say that in our opinion a
habitual residence is one which is being enjoyed voluntarily for the time being
and with the settled intention that it shall continue for some time."
In
the later case of Re F (A Minor) (Child Abduction) [1992] 1 F.L.R. at
p. 555G, Butler-Sloss L.J. considered that residence of a period of only a month
could be a sufficient period of time in which to acquire the necessary settled
intention. In such a situation I consider the fact that the court has found the
necessary settled intention established as regards the respondent, does not
preclude her from maintaining that a reconciliation had not taken place.
However, I find it more difficult to answer the related but separate
question raised in this case as to whether the particular alleged agreement was
still extant at the time the respondent left Australia with the child in
November 1992. The Lord Ordinary said in his opinion (pp. 979L-980A, supra) that
it did not matter that at the time of the departure the agreement or
understanding had been overlooked, ignored, or even forgotten by either or both
parties. At first sight I found this to be a somewhat surprising suggestion that
if at the time she left Australia the respondent was not doing so in reliance on
the agreement, she could still rely on it when she returned to Scotland. It may
well be, as suggested by the Lord Ordinary, that both parties had forgotten of
the existence of the agreement at the time she left Australia. But on reflection
I have come to be of the view that whether the agreement was extant and in force
when the respondent left Australia, must be a question of fact to be determined
by the judge at the hearing. There is no doubt that he was well aware of the
difficulties arising in this particular case and the facts relating to it. He
states that he accepted at the outset that there must be some limit as to how
far an agreement or understanding of the type in question should remain binding
on the parties to it and that, in short, there must surely come a stage when for
all practical purposes the parties can be seen as having become wholly
reconciled and to have embraced a new life together (p. 979J, supra). That in my
opinion is the correct approach and when he said the question was whether that
stage had been reached in the present case, he posed the correct question. He
answered that question, with some hesitation but after a careful review of the
facts, in the negative. Had I been answering the question myself I might not
necessarily have reached the same conclusion, but I am satisfied it cannot be
said in this case that the Lord Ordinary as the judge of first instance was not
entitled to reach the conclusion that he did. It was a matter of fact for him to
determine and nothing has been said by counsel for the petitioner that persuades
me that the Lord Ordinary was so plainly wrong that this court is entitled to
interfere with his decision on this matter.
I am therefore satisfied
that the Lord Ordinary was entitled to find that the agreement, which I have
already quoted earlier in this opinion, was made between the parties before the
respondent returned to Australia in September 1991 and that it remained in force
until November 1992 when the respondent took the child away from Australia. Once
it is established that such an agreement was made, then whilst it remained in
existence the respondent was entitled to remove the child from Australia without
seeking the permission of the petitioner to do so. He had already given his
consent to the happening of that event whenever it might occur, provided always
that the agreement had not come to an end by virtue of the fact that a
reconciliation had taken place.
The question remains as to whether the
Lord Ordinary erred in law in the interpretation of art. 13 (a) of the
Convention. It is true, as argued by counsel for the respondent, that the only
question in the grounds of appeal which deals with an alleged error in law by
the judge is the first ground of appeal and it failed to raise any question
regarding the proper interpretation of art. 13 (a) and when read appears to
relate to a matter of fact. That ground states that the error in law by the Lord
Ordinary was that he had held there existed, at the date of removal of the
child, an agreement between the parties anent removal. I accept at once that
there is considerable force in what was said on this matter by counsel, but I am
prepared to entertain the somewhat different question argued by counsel for the
petitioner for a number of reasons. She was permitted by this court to present
her argument without objection and as this matter was canvassed by her on the
first day of the appeal and as counsel for the respondent did not address the
court until the following day, he could not and did not argue that he was taken
by surprise and thus prejudiced by receiving no proper notice of it.
Furthermore, counsel for the petitioner insisted that such an agreement was
presented to the Lord Ordinary, albeit his opinion is silent on this topic.
Article 13 (a) must be considered in its context in the Convention.
There was no dispute between the parties before us that the removal of the child
had been wrongful in terms of art. 3 and that, but for the saving provisions of
art. 13, the court in Scotland would have required to order the return of the
child in terms of art. 12. Article 13 (a) reads as follows: [his Lordship quoted
the terms of art. 13 set out supra and continued:]
The argument of
counsel for the petitioner was to the effect that the respondent, who was the
person who opposed the return of the child, required to establish that the
petitioner, who was the person having the care of the child (by virtue of joint
custody according to Australian law) "had consented to the removal."
The use of the word "the" before the word "removal", according to counsel for
the petitioner, meant that consent must have been given by the petitioner to the
particular removal in question which pre-supposed knowledge on the part of the
petitioner of the actual removal at the time so that he could give the necessary
consent. Counsel said that this as a clandestine removal by the respondent and
she never told the petitioner that she was removing the child in terms of the
alleged agreement. Counsel for the petitioner seemed to accept a suggestion made
to her from the bench that, if the respondent had wished to exercise such rights
in terms of the agreement, she should have gone to the Australian courts which
were responsible for matters of custody in Australia, and obtained their
agreement to removal of the child, but I consider there is nothing in the
wording of art. 13 (a) which required that to be done.
I have considered
closely the terms of art. 13 (a) but can find no support for counsel for the
petition's suggested interpretation of it. The words "at the time of the
removal" plainly relate to and qualify the preceding words "not actually
exercising the custody rights." The use of the word "the" before the word
"removal" must mean the actual removal which took place but it does not follow
that the consent must be given instantaneously at the time because consent could
clearly be given to a removal which would take place at a future and even
indefinite date. A person could agree that a child could be removed, for
example, when the child came out of hospital and was fit enough to travel. There
would be no definite date but consent was being given for a future removal. The
use of the past tense in the words "had consented to . . . the removal"
demonstrates that at the time of removal the consent had already been given and
looks to the past prior to the removal. In other words a person could consent to
the removal of a child in the future unless some other event occurred, such as
the child not being well enough to travel. The present case is analogous to such
an example because the agreement found established by the Lord Ordinary was to
the effect that the petitioner would consent to the return of the child to
Scotland unless the parties had become reconciled. That consent, given in
September 1991 by agreement between the parties, remained in force as a matter
of fact in November 1992, as found by the Lord Ordinary. In my opinion that
situation, once accepted, clearly satisfies the requirements of the wording in
art. 13 (a).
It was finally submitted by counsel for the petitioner that
the result of upholding the Lord Ordinary's decision in this case would be to
give an opportunity to any person who abducted a child to set up an alleged
prior agreement regarding consent and thus defeat the whole purpose of the
Convention. That, in my opinion, is not the proper approach. The clear intention
of the qualification regarding consent in art. 13 (a) is to give the person
removing the child the opportunity to prove that the removal of the child was
with the consent of the "person, institution or other body having the care of
the person of the child." If such an opportunity is taken and the relevant
consent is established, then the judicial authority of the requested state is
not bound to order the return of the child as stated in terms in art. 13 of the
Convention. The existence of such consent was proved to the satisfaction of the
Lord Ordinary in the circumstances of this particular case and I can find
nothing in the wording of art. 13 (a) to prevent him reaching the conclusion
that he did. I am therefore satisfied that he did not err in law and that the
terms of para. (a), properly construed, did not prevent him from finding consent
proved and therefore holding that he was "not bound to order the return of the
child" and in the circumstances deciding not to do so.
For these reasons
I consider that the issues that are decisive in this particular case are issues
of fact. The Lord Ordinary was entitled to accept the affidavit evidence led on
behalf of the respondent and reject that led on behalf of the petitioner where
matters relating to consent were in dispute. In my opinion this reclaiming
motion therefore fails and I would refuse the appeal and adhere to the Lord
Ordinary's interlocutor of 25 March 1993.
I have had the advantage of
reading in draft the opinion of Lord Morton of Shuna. At the end of his opinion
he expresses the view that the court should act expeditiously in proceedings for
the return of children. I agree with that view. As was stated by Lord President
Hope at p. 701B of Dickson v. Dickson: "Article 11 of the
Convention provides that the judicial or administrative authorities of the
contracting states shall act expeditiously in proceedings for the return of
children. The intention is that proceedings should be conducted as quickly as
possible in order to secure the return of the child who has been wrongfully
removed from his place of habitual residence with the minimum of delay."
In this particular case the timetable was as follows. On 2 February 1993
the first order for service of the petition was pronounced. On 12 February 1993
a further order was pronounced ordaining both parties to lodge affidavits and on
2 March 1993 a first hearing was fixed for 18 March 1993. The first hearing
before the Lord Ordinary lasted for four court days, as stated earlier in this
opinion, and was completed on 24 March 1993. The opinion of the Lord Ordinary
was issued on 25 March 1993 and on 5 April a reclaiming motion by the petitioner
was marked. Thereafter the grounds of appeal were lodged on 11 May 1993 and on
23 June 1993, after legal aid had been granted to the petitioner, a request for
an early diet for the hearing of the appeal was made. The hearing before this
court was then arranged and took place on 8 and 9 July 1993. In these
circumstances there does not appear to have been any undue delay on the part of
the court authorities in this case but this is a matter that will no doubt be
kept under constant review in the future.
LORD MAYFIELD: On 25
March 1993 the Lord Ordinary dismissed the petition which had been presented to
this court by the reclaimer. The petition was presented under Pt. I of the Child
Abduction and Custody Act 1985 for the return of a child. The respondent is
Scottish and went to Australia on a 12 months' working holiday towards the end
of 1987. She met the petitioner in December 1987 and formed a relationship with
him. The petitioner is an Australian national and the parties lived together for
about two years until separating in November 1990. There was a formal separation
agreement. In terms of that agreement the respondent made over to the petitioner
her share of the house formerly occupied by them. Subsequently, when some six
months pregnant, the respondent returned to Scotland in March 1991. There was
further communication between the parties and the respondent wrote to the
petitioner on 14 April 1991 in affectionate terms and looking forward to getting
back to Australia as a family. The petitioner visited Scotland for the birth of
the child which occurred on 27 June 1991. The petitioner was registered as
father of the child and an Australian passport was obtained for her. The
petitioner then returned to Australia and some days later was joined by the
respondent who landed in Australia on about 1 September 1991. Thereafter the
parties resided together for a period of some 15 months until on or about 27
November 1992, when the respondent, having told the petitioner that she was
going to spend a weekend with relatives, boarded an aeroplane and again returned
to Scotland. She had previously consulted a solicitor who had advised that there
was nothing to prevent her from taking the child to Scotland.
In the
petition the petitioner seeks an order under the Child Abduction and Custody Act
1985 and the articles of the Hague Convention set out in Sched. 1 to the Act.
The United Kingdom and Australia are among the contracting states to this
Convention, and the effect of the Act is that so far as Scotland is concerned
the Court of Session has jurisdiction to entertain applications under the
Convention for the return of a child at the instance of any person who claims
that the child has been removed or retained in breach of custody rights,
provided that the child was habitually resident in the contracting state
immediately before any breach of those rights occurred.
The Lord
Ordinary held that while the parties had at no time been married it was accepted
that under the relevant Australian law they each shared joint custody of the
child in question. The Lord Ordinary held that the relationship between the
parties was an uneven one and observed that there was clear affidavit evidence
to the effect that the respondent became very unhappy. In setting out his
findings the Lord Ordinary has referred to an important area of dispute. The
petitioner in his affidavits emphatically denied there was any understanding
that if the parties' relationship did not work out the respondent would return
to Scotland along with the child. The respondent on the other hand maintained
that her return to Australia was part of an attempted reconciliation and it was
discussed and agreed in terms that if things did not work out both she and the
child would come back to Scotland. The Lord Ordinary considered whether or not
there was an agreement. He found as a fact that when the respondent returned to
Australia in September 1991 she did so as part of an attempted reconciliation
with the petitioner and on the express understanding that if the relationship
again failed she and the child would return and live with her mother in
Scotland. He reached that conclusion after considering all the facts and
circumstances and various affidavits. The Lord Ordinary also found from the
facts that the habitual residence of the parties was in Australia. That finding
was not disputed before this court, nor was it submitted, as averred in the
reclaiming print, that the child would be at grave risk if returned to
Australia.
Counsel for the reclaimer submitted that the Lord Ordinary
had erred in law in relation to the proper interpretation of art. 13 (a) and in
reaching the conclusion that when the respondent returned to Australia in
September 1991 she did so as part of an attempted reconciliation with the
petitioner and on the express understanding that, if the relationship again
failed, she and the child would return and live with her mother in Scotland. She
submitted that the Lord Ordinary erred in the conclusions he had reached on the
facts. She maintained that there had been no agreement between the parties about
the removal of the child. Further, even if there had been an agreement, the Lord
Ordinary erred in holding that the agreement was still extant at the date of the
removal of the child. Those were the main submissions. It was also submitted and
referred to in the grounds of appeal that the Lord Ordinary erred in drawing
inferences from surrounding circumstances in order to conclude that the
agreement did exist; and that there was insufficient evidence to find that such
an agreement existed. He also erred in holding that the affidavit evidence
presented by the respondent in respect of an agreement was credible. In my view,
even in a case such as this which depended on affidavit evidence, my
understanding is that it is for the Lord Ordinary to assess the evidence and the
significance of the various factors and the weight to be attached to them. This
court cannot interfere in the conclusions on the facts reached by the Lord
Ordinary on the evidence provided, of course, that the findings were not
perverse or that no reasonable Lord Ordinary could have reached such a
conclusion on the facts.
Initially, I was under the impression from the
opening speech of counsel for the reclaimer, as was counsel who appeared for the
respondent, that her criticisms of the Lord Ordinary's opinion were confined to
his conclusions on the facts. However, while having some sympathy with counsel
for the respondent, who submitted that no question of interpretation of art. 13
(a) had been raised in the reclaimer's first ground of appeal, the court decided
that it was appropriate that the matter of interpretation of the relevant
articles be considered. She submitted that the alleged agreement occurred 15
months before removal of the child at the date of removal. As stated earlier the
law is such that this court is obliged to accept the Lord Ordinary's conclusion
was that the petitioner both in form and in substance "'consented' to their
doing so within the meaning of art. 13 (a) of the Convention in question" (p.
979L, supra). He accepted that a stage might arise after an agreement had been
entered into when the parties could be regarded as having become wholly
reconciled and to have embraced a new life together. The conclusion he reached
was that that stage had not been reached. He explained his reasons for reaching
that conclusion. He then stated that once it had been accepted that such an
agreement or understanding was entered into it was in the circumstances still
extant and the application must be refused.
There are three articles
which are relevant to this case. Article 3 states: [his Lordship narrated the
terms of art. 3 and then art. 12 set out supra and continued:]
The
critical article, however, in my view is contained in art. 13, which states:
[his Lordship quoted the terms of art. 13 set out supra and continued:]
Counsel for the reclaimer laid considerable emphasis on the finding of
the Lord Ordinary that he had found the habitual residence (referred to in art.
3) to be in Australia. She maintained that there was an inconsistency in the
opinion of the Lord Ordinary in that he had found the habitual residence to be
in Australia but had also reached the conclusion that by November 1992 there had
not been a reconciliation. I do not myself consider that "habitual residence",
which can be established after a short period, is inconsistent with the Lord
Ordinary's finding that reconciliation had not taken place. Counsel for the
reclaimer submitted that the respondent had to establish that the petitioner had
consented to the removal. As I understood her submission, that meant
that the consent by the petitioner must have been given by the petitioner to the
actual removal and at the time of the removal. Consent applies to the particular
removal. She also stated that the respondent should have gone to the Australian
court in Victoria and obtained their agreement to the removal of the child.
I am not able to accept counsel for the reclaimer's contentions.
While the words "the removal" in art. 13 (a) refer to the actual removal
which took place it does not in my view mean that the consent must be given at
the time of removal. The words "had consented to . . . the removal" are not
consistent with that view. In my view there is nothing in the article which bars
consent to the removal sometime in the future. Nor do I accept the submission
that if the Lord Ordinary was upheld it would provide an easy opportunity to
others to avoid the provisions of the Convention by merely claiming that there
had been an agreement such as the one found by the Lord Ordinary in this case.
My understanding of the position is that the object of the provision in
art. 13 (a) is to give the party, in this case the respondent, the opportunity
to establish or satisfy the Lord Ordinary that the removal of the child was with
the consent of the other party. On the facts of the present case the Lord
Ordinary has held as a fact that there was an agreement and that the agreement
was in force at the time of removal and that the consent still stood. The Lord
Ordinary recognised that such an agreement and consent did not subsist for all
time. In this case, however, after careful consideration he found that the
agreement remained in force. In that event he was not bound to order the return
of the child because he was satisfied on the facts that the petitioner had
consented to the removal. In these circumstances the reclaiming motion should be
refused.
LORD MORTON OF SHUNA: I wholly agree with your Lordship
in the chair on every point except on the matter of statutory interpretation and
in particular on the meaning of the words "had consented . . . to the removal"
in art. 13 (a) of the Convention enacted in Sched. 1 to the Child Abduction and
Custody Act 1985.
The Lord Ordinary's finding that the child was
habitually resident in the state of Victoria and the acceptance by both parties
that by the law of Victoria the petitioner and the respondent had joint custody
of the child means that the removal of the child was wrongful under art. 3, and
under art. 12 the court in Scotland is required to order the return of the child
unless under art. 13 the respondent establishes that: "the person, institution
or other body having the care of the person of the child was not actually
exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or had
consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention."
The Lord Ordinary has held that the agreement entered into when the
respondent returned to Australia in September 1991 was to the effect: "that if
the relationship again failed she and the child would return and live with her
mother in Scotland", and that by entering into that agreement: "the petitioner,
both in form and in substance, 'consented' within the meaning of art. 13 (a) of
the Convention" (pp. 978F and 979L, supra).
In my opinion it is quite
clear that art. 13 (a) is providing only for consent to or acquiescence in a
particular act or removal or retention. The first part of art. 13 (a), with its
reference to a person not actually exercising custody rights at the time of
removal or retention, is clearly referring to the particular act of removal or
retention in question and in my opinion the phrase "or had consented to or
subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention" clearly is referring also
to the particular removal in question. If one deals only with consent to a
removal, the wording of art. 13 (a) would be "or had consented to the removal."
This interpretation appears to me to be the natural meaning of the words in the
article and to fit with what I understand to be the purpose of the Convention.
It is, I consider, clear that a main purpose of the Convention is that the court
of habitual residence should be the court to decide any issue relating to
custody of a child, with a discretion given to the court of a state to which the
child may have been removed to refuse to order the return if there has been
consent to the removal or for any of the other reasons permitted by art. 13. To
hold that a consent to subsequent removal can be given before habitual residence
has begun, and remain in force throughout the period of habitual residence, and,
so far as I could understand from the submissions of counsel, could not be
withdrawn by the petitioner, seems to me clearly not the type of consent which
was contemplated in art. 13 (a). The modern concept of the rights and duties
involved in custody of children is that the best interests of the child should
be paramount. An irrevocable consent to a possible future removal of a child
from a situation which might be very different from that contemplated when the
consent was given is difficult to fit in with the concept of the best interests
of the child being paramount. However if the consent under art. 13 is confined
to a particular removal contemplated by the other party having custody rights it
is more easy to understand that the consent, if given, is given in the best
interests of the child, and after consideration of the situation at the time of
removal.
In my opinion it is quite clear that when the respondent
decided that she could no longer live with the petitioner, the appropriate court
to decide any dispute between the parties as to the custody of the child was the
appropriate court in the state of Victoria in Australia. The respondent should
have gone to that court and sought custody of the child and authority, if that
is what she wished, to take the child to Scotland. She could, in that court,
have founded on the agreement between herself and the petitioner as an argument
in favour of granting permission for that course. The court in Australia, where
both parents were living and where the child had lived for most of her life up
to the date of the separation of the parents, was clearly in a far better
position to reach an informed conclusion on a dispute about custody. The effect
of the Lord Ordinary's decision would be that any dispute about custody of the
child will require to be decided by a Scottish court on evidence largely from
Australia. Instead of going to the court in Australia the respondent
clandestinely removed to the opposite side of the world the child when, at that
time, both the petitioner and respondent had custody rights to her. That removal
appears to me to be precisely the type of action which the Child Abduction and
Custody Act 1985 and the Convention sought to prevent or at least discourage. I
would have allowed the reclaiming motion and ordered the return of the child to
Australia. However as your Lordships have reached a contrary conclusion I must
respectfully dissent.
It is, I consider, most unfortunate that this
action has taken so long in the Scottish courts. The petition was first in court
in February 1993 and the Lord Ordinary issued his opinion on 25 March 1993. The
reclaiming motion was heard on 8 and 9 July 1993. Article 11 of the Convention
provides that: "The judicial or administrative authority of the contracting
States shall act expeditiously in proceedings for the return of children."
The article continues with a paragraph that suggests that a decision
should be reached within six weeks. In this case the proceedings have so far
taken five months. In England it appears that a decision usually takes much less
time, even if appealed. For example in Re F (A Minor) (Child Abduction)
the summons first came before a judge on 16 July 1991, a hearing took place on
18 July and the judge on 19 July ordered that the child be returned. An appeal
was taken to the Court of Appeal and was refused on 31 July 1991. That timetable
appears to me to be an exemplary example of expedition. It is very unfortunate
that this case, and especially the reclaiming motion, was not treated with the
expedition required by the Convention.
__________________________________
Statutory provisions
The
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, set out in
Sched. 1 to the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985, provides:
"Article 3
"The removal or the retention of a child is
to be considered wrongful where -- (a) it is in breach of rights of custody
attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or
alone, under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident
immediately before the removal or retention; and (b) at the time of removal or
retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or
would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention.
"The
rights of custody mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) above may arise in particular
by operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by
reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law of that State.
"Article 4
"The Convention shall apply to any child who
was habitually resident in a Contracting State immediately before any breach of
custody or access rights. The Convention shall cease to apply when the child
attains the age of 16 years.
"Article 5
"For the
purposes of this Convention -- (a) 'rights of custody' shall include rights
relating to the care of the person of the child and, in particular, the right to
determine the child's place of residence; (b) 'rights of access' shall include
the right to take a child for a limited period of time to a place other than the
child's habitual residence. . . .
"Article 12
"Where a
child has been wrongfully removed or retained in terms of Article 3 and, at the
date of the commencement of the proceedings before the judicial or
administrative authority of the Contracting State where the child is, a period
of less than one year has elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or
retention, the authority concerned shall order the return of the child
forthwith. . . .
"Article 13
"Notwithstanding the
provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or administrative authority of
the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if the person,
institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that -- (a) the
person, institution or other body having the care of the person of the child was
not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention,
or had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention."
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