http://www.incadat.com/ ref.: HC/E/UKs 28 [29/04/1992; Inner House of the Court of Session (Second Division) (Scotland); Appellate Court] Whitley v. Whitley 1992 GWD 22-1248
INNER HOUSE OF THE COURT OF SESSION (Second Division)
29 April 1992
Lord Justice Clerk (Ross), Lord Murray, Lord Morison
L.W. v J.W.
Counsel: Act: A Smith et Davie, Dundas & Wilson; Alt: Martin, QC et Liddle, Drummond Miller
LORD JUSTICE CLERK (ROSS), (Reading the Opinion of the Court): The
petitioner is a Petty Officer in the United States Navy. He is the husband of
the respondent. The parties are the parents of two children, T, who was born on
19 March 1988 at Oakland, California, and L, who was born on 14 December 1989 at
Novalo, California. Both children are citizens of the United States of America.
Until the children were brought to Scotland by the respondent on 24 October
1991, they were habitually resident in the United States of America and latterly
in Norfolk, Virginia.
In the petition, the petitioner seeks an order
under the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985 and the Articles of the Hague
Convention set out in Schedule 1 to the Act. The respondent opposes the return
of the children.
In the pleadings it is admitted by the respondent that
in terms of section 31-1 of the Code of Virginia (as amended) both the
petitioner and the respondent were joint natural guardians of the children at
the material time with equal legal rights in regard to them. It is also admitted
that such rights are custody rights and include the right to determine the place
of residence of the children; and that the removal of the children to Scotland
by the respondent was a breach of the petitioner's custody rights. The Minute of
Proceedings shows that before the Lord Ordinary it was expressly conceded on
behalf of the respondent that the removal of the children was wrongful in terms
of Article 3 of the Convention. At the commencement of the hearing in the Inner
House, counsel for the respondent sought leave to amend the Answers by
withdrawing the concession made and by denying that the removal of the children
to Scotland by the respondent was a breach of the petitioner's custody rights.
After hearing parties, we refused leave to make that amendment. Accordingly, it
remains the position that the respondent concedes that the removal of the
children is to be considered wrongful in terms of Article 3 of the Convention.
Article 11 of the Convention provides that the judicial or
administrative authorities of Contracting States shall act expeditiously for the
return of children.
Article 12 provides inter alia --
"Where a
child has been wrongfully removed or retained in terms of Article 3 and, at the
date of the commencement of the proceedings before the judicial or
administrative authority of the Contracting State where the child is, a period
of less than one year has elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or
retention, the authority concerned shall order the return of the child
forthwith".
Article 13 provides inter alia --
"Notwithstanding
the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or administrative
authority of the request State is not bound to order the return of the child if
the person, institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that
--
(b) there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the
child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an
intolerable situation".
Before the Lord Ordinary the respondent
contended that in the present case there was grave risk that the return of the
children to the United States of America and to the petitioner would expose them
to physical or psychological harm or would otherwise place them in an
intolerable situation. Before the Lord Ordinary both parties relied upon
affidavit evidence and other documentary material produced by them. Before this
court, it was suggested that the respondent had invited the Lord Ordinary to
allow a proof into parties averments, but there is no record of any such motion
in the Minute of Proceedings, nor in the Lord Ordinary's Opinion. From the
Minutes of Proceedings, it appears that parties may initially have expected a
proof to take place, but both parties appear to have acquiesced in the hearing
before the Lord Ordinary proceeding upon the basis of affidavits and other
documentary material.
After considering the terms of the affidavits and
documentary material and hearing the submissions of parties, the Lord Ordinary
concluded that no case had been made out for the operation of Article 13 of the
Convention. He accordingly pronounced an interlocutor holding that the
petitioner was entitled to an order for the return of the children to the United
States of America under the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985. Against that
interlocutor of the Lord Ordinary the respondent has reclaimed.
Before
the Lord Ordinary the respondent advanced three principal heads of criticism
against the petitioner's conduct, and submitted that because of certain defects
in the petitioner's past conduct and in his character there was a grave risk
that the return of the two children to him would expose them to physical or
psychological harm and would otherwise place them in an intolerable situation in
terms of Article 13. Before this court counsel for the respondent submitted that
the Lord Ordinary had erred in concluding that the material before him did not
establish that the children would be exposed to such grave risk of physical or
psychological harm and would be placed in an intolerable situation. Mrs Smith
for the respondent repeated the criticisms advanced before the Lord Ordinary,
and subjected the affidavits of the witnesses to a close analysis. She drew the
attention of the court to numerous passages in the affidavits of the parties and
the other witnesses.
Although the Lord Ordinary in this case did not
have the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses, Mrs Smith accepted that
before this court would be justified in interfering with the decision of the
Lord Ordinary, this court would require to be satisfied that the conclusion of
the Lord Ordinary on the facts was one at which no reasonable Lord Ordinary
could have arrived. She sought to satisfy this court that having regard to the
terms of the affidavits, the only proper conclusion which could be drawn was
that returning the children to the United States of America would involve a
grave risk of physical or psychological harm, or would otherwise place the
children in an intolerable situation.
We do not find it necessary to
rehearse the submissions made by counsel in support of the criticisms of the
petitioner's conduct and character. Suffice it to say that these fell under
three heads; it was said that he was financially irresponsible; it was also
contended that he had abused alcohol although Mrs Smith explained that she did
not suggest that he was an alcoholic; it was also maintained that the petitioner
had abused drugs, and that this showed that he was an immature, irresponsible
and unpredictable young man.
As regards the allegation of financial
irresponsibility, the Lord Ordinary accepted that there had been financial
problems, but his conclusion was expressed as follows
"I find that the
petitioner's explanations about the reasons for the parties' financial
difficulties up to this point (summer of 1988) more convincing than those of the
respondent".
As regards suggestions of the petitioner's extravagance in
the purchasing of clothing, and the respondent's use of welfare shops for the
purchase of clothing for the children, the Lord Ordinary found the petitioner's
explanation in relation to these matters to be more credible. The Lord Ordinary
also found that the petitioner's explanation of the outlays which the respondent
would have to meet from the money allotted to her by him was more compelling.
The Lord Ordinary found it of significance that there was no suggestion that the
parties were ever substantially in debt or that they were lacking in the
necessities of life. The Lord Ordinary also observed that the petitioner remains
enlisted in the United States Navy, and that there is nothing to suggest that
his service pay is insufficient to maintain his family. He accepts that the
petitioner is able to provide accommodation in which the children can live with
him and his mother.
As regards the allegations of alcohol abuse, the
Lord Ordinary expressed his conclusion as follows
"On this matter I
consider that the balance of the material before me indicates that on occasions
during the marriage the petitioner was drunk or affected by alcohol, that he
could behave stupidly when in drink and that this distressed the respondent.
However I consider it as of some importance that the respondent did not feel
that she could suggest that there were any substantial problems with the
petitioner's drinking habits at interview in August 1991 and further that there
is no suggestion that these have affected his service duties or career".
As regards the allegations of drug abuse, the Lord Ordinary noted that
it was never suggested that the petitioner was a drug addict. The suggestion was
that he occasionally dabbled in hard drugs, and this was expressly denied by the
respondent in his affidavit. On thiis issue the Lord Ordinary stated
"I
do not find it possible on the conflicting material on affidavit to resolve this
matter so far as the petitioner's past conduct is concerned".
The Lord
Ordinary also observed that it is not suggested by the respondent that the
petitioner has indulged in taking drugs since returning from a world cruise in
US Enterprise in March 1990.
The Lord Ordinary also expressed the view
that the criticisms of the petitioner's character and conduct appear to be
exaggerated. He expressly applied his mind to the question of whether it had
been shown that there was a grave risk that returning the children to him would
expose them to physical or psychological harm, and he concluded
"Such
defects as there may be in the petitioner's past conduct and in his character
are not such as to constitute such grave risk, in my opinion".
In our
opinion on the material before him, the Lord Ordinary was fully entitled to
arrive at such a conclusion, and nothing which has been put forward by Mrs Smith
would persuade us that the Lord Ordinary had arrived at any wrong conclusion in
this regard.
Before this court Mrs Smith at one stage appeared to be
contending that the petitioner on occasions had exhibited violence towards the
children. In her affidavit the respondent maintained that at one stage he had
begun "to get physically over-rough with the girls". The respondent, however,
has made no averments to that effect in her pleadings, and the Lord Ordinary in
his Opinion records that counsel for the respondent had made it clear to him
that she did not suggest that there had been physical or sexual abuse of the
children, and there was no suggestion of danger to the children while the
petitioner had been with them. In these circumstances we are not prepared to
consider the suggestion now being made to the effect that the petitioner had
exhibited some violent behaviour towards the children.
Before the Lord
Ordinary it was contended that in the light of the criticisms made of his
conduct and behaviour, the petitioner was an immature, irresponsible and
unpredictable young man. Although it is not specifically mentioned in the
pleadings, before the Lord Ordinary the respondent founded upon the terms of a
letter dated 5 January 1990 which the petitioner had sent to the respondent's
friend Miss Wendy Smith. Although the Lord Ordinary's attention was drawn to
this letter, he makes no mention of it in his Opinion. Before this court Mrs
Smith contended that this letter gave rise to great concern, and that it
demonstrated immaturity on the part of the petitioner; she maintained that the
letter was of significance when consideration was given to the question of
whether the children should be returned to the petitioner. She submitted that
the letter showed that the petitioner was immature and had been indulging in a
dual fantasy, in that he fantasised that he was in loco parentis in relation to
Miss Wendy Smith, and that he had a sexual relationship with Miss Wendy Smith.
There is no doubt that this letter reflects no credit upon the petition.
It contains indecent material, it is a silly letter, and must have been highly
offensive to Miss Wendy Smith. The petitioner in his affidavit recognises that
the letter was a stupid one; he states that he did not mean it to be taken
seriously and that it was written from Singapore after a tedious trip across the
Pacific Ocean. If the letter was meant to be a joke, it was a joke in very bad
taste. However, it is to the petitioner's credit that subsequently in October
1991 he apologised to Miss Wendy Smith for the letter although she appears to
have been surprised that he should have raised the subject at that stage.
However that may be, and however reprehensible it may be that the letter was
ever sent, we are not persuaded that it demonstrates that returning the children
to him would involve any grave risk that the children would be exposed to
physical or psychological harm.
In considering the respondent's
allegation about the petitioner's conduct and character, it is also necessary to
have regard to his evidence on these matters and, perhaps more importantly, the
evidence which has been provided by others in the United States Navy including
the petitioner's superior officers. Chad Dotson who serves in the United States
Marine Corp and was apparently a neighbour of the parties at Norfolk has deponed
that he frequently saw the parties together, that he had never seen the
petitioner use drugs or abuse alcohol, and that he has never observed any
indication of financial problems, and that the children have always appeared
well clothed and fed. Annette Harrod states that she worked in the same office
as the petitioner and spoke to the respondent almost every day. She never saw
anything which would lead her to believe the allegations now being made against
him. There is also evidence regarding the random testing of United States Navy
personnel for drugs, and it is stated that the petitioner has participated in
numerous urinalysis testing always with negative results. Three is also a report
from the Psychiatry Department of the Naval Hospital Portsmouth, Virginia
explaining that the petitioner was seen for evaluation and recommendations for
treatment after a motor cycle accident, and with particular reference to
possible alcohol involvement. He was apparently seen along with the respondent
who corroborated his assertion that there was no known family history of
alcoholism and that his average consumption of alcohol was moderate. The
conclusion of the report was that the petitioner had no indications of alcohol
dependence at that time (August 1991). In her affidavit, the respondent
maintains that she falsely informed the person interviewing them that the
petitioner did not have a drink problem, and that his consumption of alcohol was
moderate, she maintains that she did this because the petitioner threatened her
that if she did not assist him he would never allow her to leave with the
children. We do no regard this as a convincing explanation on the respondent's
part. In any event, we agree with Mr Martin for the petitioner that what is most
important in the report from the Psychiatry Department is that it contains an
objective conclusion that there was no indication of alcohol dependence on the
part of the petitioner.
Number 19/10 of process is a reference from a
Leading Chief Petty Officer to the effect that the petitioner by February 1992
has been assigned as Assistant Leading Petty Officer in the Military Acute Care
Department. This position is said to be one of high responsibility and is
reserved only for "top notch" performers. The writer comments favourably upon
the petitioner's sustained superior performance at his work. Number 19/11 is
another reference from a Chief Petty Officer to the effect that the petitioner
has never come to work under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and that his
work has always been of the highest calibre. It describes him as "one of the US
Navy's top Petty Officers". Number 19/14 of process is a letter from Captain
Smith of the Medical Service Corp. It confirms his reliability at his work. In
the course of the letter it is stated
"Petty Officer W. has not
demonstrated any tendency towards alcohol abuse and the Navy policy regarding
drug testing/drug abuse is strictly enforced. Petty Officer W. is considered to
be reliable in all aspects relating to his military functions, responsibilities,
and assignments".
We agree with Mr Martin that that material from the US
Navy is inconsistent with the criticisms alleged against the petitioner by the
respondent, and supports the Lord Ordinary's view that the respondent has failed
to make out a case for the operation of Article 13 of the Convention.
Before the Lord Ordinary the respondent advanced a distinct submission
to the effect that there was a grave risk that the children if returned would be
exposed to psychological harm in respect of reports obtained from the Director
of Clinical Psychology Services at the Royal Hospital for Six Children,
Edinburgh. The Lord Ordinary has dealt with these reports in his Opinion. As the
Lord Ordinary recognised these reports depend upon an assessment of the
petitioner which he considered was not justified in the material before him. As
the writer of the report recognised, she proceeded solely upon the basis of
information provided to her by the respondent concerning the petitioner's
attitude and behaviour; she had never met the petitioner nor heard his account
of the marriage. In these circumstances, the reports appear to us to be
defective. Moreover it is clear that the reports were written with the issue of
custody in mind. In the first report, the writer makes several general comments
about the appropriate parenting of young children in custody and access
disputes; she comments that the welfare of the children should be paramount in
such situations. The conclusion which is expressed at the end of the day is in
the following terms
"On balance it would seem that the better
arrangement from the childrens' point of view would be for the care and custody
of the children to be provided by their mother".
The present proceedings
do not relate to the custody of or access to the children. All that the court is
being invited to do in the present proceedings is to order that the children
should be returned to the United States of America. Questions of custody or
access will then be determined by the competent court in the United States of
America. As the Lord Ordinary remarks, it has been observed by Butler Sloss LJ
in C v C [1989] 2 All ER 465, that the Convention does not require the court in
this country to consider the welfare of the child as paramount, but only to be
satisfied as to the grave risk of harm. It is significant that in the original
report provided by the clinical psychologist, the report is stated to be an
assessment of the psychological risk which might be incurred by returning the
children to the custody of their father, and yet it is not stated in that report
that there would in the view of the writer be any such psychological risk. Nor
is there any suggestion in the second report that there would be any such
psychological risk. In the final report from the clinical psychologist No 30/1
of process, the clinical psychologist does express a view upon this matter. In
the course of the report it is stated
"If either of these children were
to be permanently separated from their mother, I would suggest that there would
be grave risk that they would suffer at least temporary psychological damage
which could last for a period up to months if not longer. They would both
exhibit a grief reaction, become bewildered, show regression to an earlier stage
of development and exhibit some of a range of difficult behaviours, from
withdrawal, anger and fear through to aggression and 'bad' behaviour as
described in para 3 of my original report, eg loss of toilet training, speech
regression etc".
At the end of the report the following conclusion is
expressed --
"If the children were returned to the United States, and
L.W.'s behaviour did not change from that reported, both personally and towards
his daughters, then the worst solution intolerable for his children would have
been arrived at and the children would be at risk of severe psychological and
physical harm".
This report, however, appears to us to be based on a
number of false premises. On the basis of information provided to her by the
respondent, the clinical psychologist describes the petitioner as having a
tendency to seek immediate gratification of his wishes, to spend extravagant
amounts on alcohol and other goods, and indeed to have required treatment for
alcoholism, and to be not unfamiliar with hard drugs. We are not satisfied that
these premises are correct. In particular there is no justification for the
statement that he ever required treatment for alcoholism. Apart from that, the
report appears to proceed upon the view that the children are to be returned to
the petitioner who alone is to be responsible for looking after them. The report
ignores what the clinical psychologist had been given to understand at the time
when she wrote her first report, namely, that the petitioner was to make
arrangements for his mother to care for the children. In these circumstances we
agree with the way in which the Lord Ordinary has treated these reports. The
Lord Ordinary accepted that some psychological harm to the children was inherent
in the situation where it was necessary to consider operating the machinery of
the Convention, but he was not satisfied that any grave risk of psychological
harm would arise if the children were returned to the United States of America.
The whole problem in this case has arisen from the fact that the respondent
wrongfully removed the children from their home in the United States of America.
She is now contending that the children would suffer psychological harm if they
were to be removed from her and returned to the United States. In C v C (supra)
Butler Sloss LJ said
"If the grave risk of psychological harm to a child
is to be inflicted by the conduct of the parent who abducted him, then it would
be relied on by every mother of a young child who removed him out of the
jurisdiction and refused to return. It would drive a coach and four through the
Convention, at least in respect of applications relating to young children. I,
for my part, cannot believe that this is in the interests of international
relations. Nor should the mother, by her own actions, succeed in preventing the
return of a child who should be living in his own country and deny him contact
with his other parent. As Balcombe LJ said in Re E (a minor) (Abduction) (1989)
1 FLR 135 at 142
' . . . the whole purpose of this Convention is . . .
to ensure that parties do not gain adventitious advantage by either removing a
child wrongfully from the country of its usual residence, or, having taken the
child, with the agreement of any other party who has custodial rights, to
another jurisdiction, then wrongfully to retain that child'".
In the
course of the hearing before this court a number of authorities were cited
including Viola v Viola 1988 SLT 7; Macmillan v Macmillan 1989 SLT 350; Dickson
v Dickson 1990 SCLR 692; Re A (a minor) (Abduction) [1988] 1 FLR 365; Re C (a
minor) (Abduction) [1989] 1 FLR 403; Re G (a minor) (Abduction) [1989] 2 FLR 475
and Re F (a minor) (Abduction: Jurisdiction [1991] 1 FLR 1. We were also
referred to the unreported case of Slamen v Slamen (23 August 1991). Some of
these cases were cited for the purpose of showing that on occasions the court
has only made an order for the return of a child to the country from which he
has been taken on undertakings being given by the party seeking their return. If
the court is satisfied that returning the child would expose the child to a
grave risk of physical or psychological harm or would otherwise place the child
in an intolerable situation, one can readily understand that the party seeking
the return of the child might then seek to persuade the court that the harm
apprehended might be diminished if certain undertakings were given. In the
present case, where we are satisfied that the Lord Ordinary was entitled to
conclude that there was no such grave risk, there does not appear to us to be
any need to consider whether or not undertakings might be put forward. No
question of offering undertakings was in fact raised before us.
It is
plain from the terms of Article 13 that the onus of establishing that there is a
grave risk that returning the child would expose the child to physical or
psychological harm or would otherwise place the child in an intolerable
situation rests upon the party opposing the return of the child, that is, in
this case the respondent. For the reasons already expressed we are satisfied
that the Lord Ordinary was fully entitled to conclude the respondent had failed
to discharge that onus. Indeed if the matter had been at large for this court,
in the light of the material before the court, we too would have concluded that
the respondent had failed to discharge the onus incumbent upon her in terms of
Article 13.
For the foregoing reasons we have refused the reclaiming
motion and have made an order in terms of Article 12 of the Convention for the
return of the children to the petitioner. In terms of Article 12, the court is
required to order the return of these children subject only to the exceptions
set out in Article 13. As the respondent has failed to establish the exception
upon which she founded under Article 13, this court is obliged to make the
order. The petitioner is presently in this country, and we have ordered that the
children should be delivered to him within 48 hours.
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